The Death Penalty and the Debate over the U.S. Supreme Court’s Citation of Foreign and International Law by Segal, Yitzchok
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 33 | Number 5 Article 4
2006
The Death Penalty and the Debate over the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Citation of Foreign and
International Law
Yitzchok Segal
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Accounting Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yitzchok Segal, The Death Penalty and the Debate over the U.S. Supreme Court’s Citation of Foreign and International Law, 33 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 1421 (2006).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol33/iss5/4
SEGAL_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011 10:21 PM 
 
101 
THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE DEBATE OVER 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S CITATION OF 
FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Yitzchok Segal* 
BACKGROUND 
Is it appropriate to use foreign and international law to interpret the 
United States Constitution?  Should the United States Supreme Court be 
permitted to cite foreign and international law in interpreting the U.S. 
Constitution?1
 
* I would like to thank John Feerick, Professor and former Dean, Fordham University 
School of Law, and Daniel Richman, Professor, Fordham University School of Law, for 
their remarks on an earlier draft of this Comment.  I would also like to thank Martin 
Flaherty, Professor, Fordham University School of Law, for some valuable suggestions that 
were incorporated into this Comment. 
  These questions have generated much interest and 
 1. For the purposes of this Comment, “international law” may be understood as the law 
that binds nation-states; “foreign law” may be understood as the law of other sovereign 
nation-states; and “comparative law” may be understood as all non-U.S. legal materials, 
including both international and foreign law. 
  It is also critical to clarify the parameters of the issue.  The debate over the Supreme 
Court’s use of comparative law has generally been limited to its use as persuasive evidence; 
most ardent proponents of citing comparative materials do not suggest that the Court may 
cite foreign and international law in purely domestic issues as controlling precedent.  For 
example, Justice Breyer is perhaps the Court’s most vocal proponent of using comparative 
legal materials in U.S. constitutional interpretation, yet even he has stated that these 
materials are not controlling.  See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (stating “[o]bviously this foreign authority does not bind us”), overruled by 
Moore v. Kinney, 278 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2002); see also, e.g., Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, 
I’d Love to Talk With You, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 44 (“[T]he Court’s recent 
references to foreign decisions and practice do not treat them as binding.”).  But see Martin 
S. Flaherty, Judicial Globalization in the Service of Self-Government, 20 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFF. J. (forthcoming 2006).  My thanks to the author for making this article available to me. 
  Further, both sides of this debate agree that in certain situations comparative 
materials are relevant.  These situations include interpreting treaties, adjudicating a case 
involving a choice-of-law provision in a contract on which the U.S. suit is based, cases 
involving the constitutional provision authorizing Congress to “punish Offences against the 
Law of the Nations,” cases involving admiralty law, and asylum cases where a foreign 
decision reveals that a foreign nation persecutes members of an asylum-seeking ethnic 
group.  See, e.g., Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL 
AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 40; Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address, Foreign Legal Authority in 
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controversy.  While many justices and commentators endorse citations to 
foreign and international law, others have argued that it is inappropriate to 
interpret the U.S. Constitution based on non-U.S. law.2
Indeed, the appropriateness of using foreign and international law in 
interpreting the U.S. Constitution is arguably the most controversial 
jurisprudential issue in recent years.  It has invoked impassioned rhetoric 
and violent death threats aimed at Justice Ginsburg and former Justice 
O’Connor
 
3 and has spawned an impressive, ever-growing body of literature 
comprised of articles by justices,4 legal commentators,5 and journalists.6
 
the Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305 (2004) [hereinafter Scalia, Keynote 
Address]; Harvie Wilkinson III, The Use of International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423 (2004). 
  
  In sum, the issue is: is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to cite foreign and 
international law as persuasive evidence in purely domestic issues? 
  To a significant extent, this debate hinges on larger issues such as the purpose of the 
Constitution, the usefulness of comparative constitutional analysis, and the proper method 
of the interpretation of the Constitution.  See, e.g., Louis J. Blum, Comment, Mixed Signals: 
The Limited Role of Comparative Analysis in Constitutional Adjudication, 39 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 157, 200 n.15 (2002); Donald E. Childress III, Note, Using Comparative 
Constitutional Law to Resolve Domestic Federal Questions, 53 DUKE L.J. 193 (2003) 
(relating the differing judicial opinions in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) to the 
interpretive posture of the justices); Jackson, supra at 46; Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious 
Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 640 (1999) (arguing that the receptiveness of a system of constitutional law 
to borrowings from other systems will depend on the constitutional model employed); Mark 
Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 239, 241 (2003) 
[hereinafter Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law] (relating the debate over 
the relevance of non-U.S. law to constitutional interpretation to the broader debates over the 
proper interpretation of the Constitution).  A historical overview of several dominant 
interpretive theories is provided by PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1982).  For a recent attempt to describe the debate over constitutional 
interpretive methods, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 
CAL. L. REV. 535 (1999). 
 2. See infra notes 3-4. 
 3. Former Judge Robert Bork, for example, has called the Court’s recent citations to 
foreign and international law “risible,” “absurd,” and “flabbergasting.”  Robert H. Bork, 
Whose Constitution is it Anyway?, NAT’L REV., Dec. 8, 2003, at 37 [hereinafter Bork, 
Whose Constitution?]; Robert H. Bork, Has The Supreme Court Gone Too Far? (October 
2003), available at 
http://www.committeeforjustice.org/contents/news/news100103_commentary.shtml 
[hereinafter Bork, Gone Too Far?].  Both former Justice O’Connor and Justice Ginsburg 
have been threatened with death because of their comparative law citations.  Posting of 
Mickey McLean to World Views blog, 
http://www.worldmagblog.com/blog/archives/023255.html (Mar. 16, 2006, 1:12 EST). 
 4. Judges who have written or spoken on this subject outside of judicial opinions 
include Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World’s a Courtroom: Judging 
in the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273 (1997); Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme 
Court and the Law of the Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39 (1994); Stephen Breyer, Keynote 
Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265 (2003) [hereinafter Breyer, Keynote Address]; 
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative 
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329 (2004); Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human 
Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 (1999); Michael Kirby, Think Globally, 4 GREEN 
BAG 2D 287 (2001); Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American 
Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, 45 FED. LAW. 20 (1998); Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Keynote Address: Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society 
of International Law, in 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348 (2002) [hereinafter O’Connor, 
Keynote Address]; Claire L’Heureux-Dubè, Remark, The Importance of Dialogue: 
Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15 
(1998); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, What Role Should Foreign Practice and Precedent Play 
in the Interpretation of Domestic Law?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893 (2005); Posner, 
supra note 1; William H. Rehnquist, Foreword to DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at vii, viii-ix (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002); 
William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks, in GERMANY AND ITS 
BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE: A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul 
Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993); Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International 
Law in the American Adjudicative Process, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431 (2004); 
Wilkinson, supra note 1; Bork, Whose Constitution?, supra note 3; Bork, Gone Too Far?, 
supra note 3; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: 
The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Feb. 7, 2006), 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-07b-06.html [hereinafter 
Ginsburg, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind]; Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Remarks to the Southern Center for International Studies (Oct. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor_transcript.pdf; Sandra Day O’Connor, O’Connor 
Extols Role of International Law (Oct. 27, 2004), 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/10/27/scotus.oconnor.ap; Scalia, Keynote Address, supra 
note 1; Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Discussion on the Constitutional Relevance of 
Foreign Court Decisions at the American University Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 
2005), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/supctLawScaliaBreyer.pdf 
[hereinafter Scalia & Breyer, Discussion on the Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court 
Decisions]. 
 5. Articles discussing the debate over citations to foreign and international law as well 
as the value of comparative sources in U.S. constitutional interpretation include Bruce 
Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997); T. Alexander 
Aleinkoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on 
the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91 (2004); Roger P. Alford, 
Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 675 (2003) [hereinafter Alford, Federal Courts]; Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, 
International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference: A Postscript on Lawrence v. 
Texas, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 913 (2004) [hereinafter Alford, Postscript on Lawrence]; Roger P. 
Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 
(2004) [hereinafter Alford,  Misusing]; Osmar J. Benvenuto, Note, Reevaluating the Debate 
Surrounding the Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Precedent, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2695 
(2006); Blum, supra note 1; Childress, supra note 1; Lawrence Connell, The Supreme 
Court, Foreign Law, and Constitutional Governance, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 59 (2004); Sujit 
Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999); Flaherty, supra  note 1; David 
Fontana, The Next Generation of Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law Scholarship: 
A Reply to Professor Tushnet, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 445 (2004) [hereinafter Fontana, The 
Next Generation]; David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA 
L. REV. 539 (2001); Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the 
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Outside the pages of the Court’s official reporter, several Justices have 
spoken publicly about the proper role of comparative legal materials in 
U.S. constitutional interpretation.7  For instance, in a rare public debate, 
Supreme Court Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia argued the 
merits of citing foreign and international law in the Court’s opinions.8  
Recently, at the nomination hearings of Justices John Roberts and Samuel 
Alito, senators fired questions at the candidates regarding the role of 
comparative legal materials, probing them to publicly announce their views 
on this explosive issue.9
 
Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357 (2005); Sarah K. Harding, 
Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 409 (2003); Jackson, 
supra note 1; Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: 
Opening Up the Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 583 (1999); Mark W. Janis, Dred Scott and International Law, 43 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 763 (2005); Ken I. Kersch, The New Legal Transnationalism, the 
Globalized Judiciary, and the Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345 (2005); 
Harold Hongju Koh, International Law As Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004) 
[hereinafter Koh, International Law]; Kreimer, supra note 1; David S. Law, Generic 
Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652 (2005); Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When 
Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353 (2004); Gerald 
L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 82 (2004); Matthew S. Raalf, Note, A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: Why the Debate 
Surrounding Comparative Constitutional Law is Spectacularly Ordinary, 73 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1239 (2004); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: 
Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69 (2004); Leila Nadya Sadat, An 
American Vision for Global Justice: Taking the Rule of (International) Law Seriously, 4 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 329 (2005); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999); Tushnet, 
Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, supra note 1. 
 
 6. Articles discussing this issue in the popular press are legion.  See, e.g., Ann 
Althouse, Innocence Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2005, at A25; Elizabeth Greathouse, 
Justices See Joint Issues with the EU, WASH. POST, July 9, 1998, at A24; Anne E. Kornblut, 
Justice Ginsburg Backs Value of Foreign Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005, at A10; Charles 
Lane, Thinking Outside The U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2003, at A13; Felix G. Rohatyn, Op-
Ed, Dead to the World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23; Jeffrey Toobin, Swinging Shift: 
How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW 
YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/050912fa_fact. 
 7. Presentations by Supreme Court Justices include Breyer, Keynote Address, supra 
note 4; O’Connor, Keynote Address, supra note 4; Scalia, Keynote Address, supra note 1; 
Ginsburg, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind, supra note 4; Scalia & 
Breyer, Discussion on the Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, supra note 
4. 
 8. Scalia & Breyer, Discussion on the Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court 
Decisions, supra note 4. 
 9. A complete transcript of the Roberts hearings may be found at http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/05257/571043.stm (last visited Oct. 12, 2006); a complete transcript of the 
Alito hearings may be found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/10/AR2006011000781.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006). 
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Perhaps most strikingly, citations to foreign and international law by 
U.S. courts have provoked the proposal of a congressional resolution 
stating that “judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of 
the United States should not be based in whole or in part on judgments, 
laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions . . . .”10  Similarly, the 
Court’s citations to comparative legal materials have provoked the proposal 
of a bill by several senators stating that in interpreting the Constitution, a 
court may not rely on “any constitution, law, administrative rule, Executive 
Order, directive, policy, judicial decision, or any other action of any foreign 
state or international organization or agency, other than English 
constitutional and common law.”11
The Supreme Court’s use of foreign and international law in interpreting 
the Constitution is not itself revolutionary; throughout its history, the Court 
has freely drawn on supranational law.
 
12
 
 10. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004); Press Release, Rep. Tom Feeney, Reaffirmation 
of American Independence Resolution Approved (May 13, 2004), available at 
  Thus, it is not the Court’s mere 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/fl24_feeney/ResConstitutionSubPassage.shtml.  The 
Resolution states: 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that judicial 
determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of the United States should not 
be based in whole or in part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign 
institutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements are 
incorporated into the legislative history of laws passed by the elected legislative 
branches of the United States or otherwise inform an understanding of the original 
meaning of the laws of the United States.  
H.R. Res. 568. 
  The preface to the resolution states that inappropriate judicial reliance on foreign 
laws threatens the separation of powers.  Id.  The resolution’s sponsor has even suggested 
that a Justice’s failure to comply with the resolution may constitute grounds for 
impeachment. Tom Curry, A Flap Over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court, MSNBC, 
Mar. 11, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232/.  Regarding the resolution, see 
Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 67 
(2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:92673.wais; Hadar Harris, “We Are 
the World”—or Are We? The United States’ Conflicting Views on the Use of International 
and Foreign Legal Decisions, 12 NO. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 5 (2005), available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/12/123.pdf?rd=1; Jeffrey McDermott, Citation to 
Foreign Precedent: Congress vs. The Courts, 51 FED. LAW. 20 (2004).  A related 
congressional bill threatening to prohibit any reference to foreign materials has also been 
introduced.  See H.R. Res. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 11. This bill is called the Constitution Restoration Act of 2004.  S. 2323, 108th Cong. 
(2004). 
 12. See, e.g., Alan A. Levasseur, The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, in THE USE OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS 315, 325-31 (Ulrich Drobing & Sjef van Erp eds., 1997); 
Connell, supra note 5, at 69; Glensy, supra note 5, at 361-73; Neuman, supra note 5, at 82-
84. 
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use of comparative legal sources that has sparked the recent debate, it is the 
context of these references.  The Court has recently cited foreign and 
international law to support key positions in high-profile cases dealing with 
hyper-sensitive domestic issues, including the death penalty.13  The Court 
has more than once abrogated its holdings in prior decisions, in part due to 
foreign and international law.14  These references seem to indicate a 
conscious movement toward a transnational adjudication model and have 
impelled the dramatic controversy over the relevance of foreign and 
international law in U.S. constitutional interpretation.15
The Supreme Court is sharply divided into two opposing factions 
regarding the function of comparative legal sources in the U.S. legal 
system.
 
16  Within the past two decades alone, the relevance of comparative 
legal sources in U.S. constitutional interpretation has been contested, at 
times quite heatedly, in eight Supreme Court cases.17
The split among the Supreme Court Justices has primarily occurred 
along the liberal/conservative ideological divide—liberal-minded Justices 
tend toward the internationalist camp while conservative-minded Justices 
tend toward the nationalist camp.  For example, in the highly contentious 
Lawrence v. Texas decision, Justice Kennedy led a majority of the Court in 
holding that a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same 
 
 
 13. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 598 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). 
 14. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304; 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), abrogated by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
 15. See, e.g., Janet Koven Levitt, Going Public with Transnational Law: The 2002-2003 
Supreme Court Term, 39 TULSA L. REV. 155, 155 (2003) (“The Court’s international and 
foreign law citations were not, in and of themselves, revolutionary or ‘breakthrough.’  It was 
the Court’s decision to use such citations in the highest profile, potentially most 
controversial cases . . . .”).  During the last twenty years, the Court has used comparative 
materials in Eighth Amendment cases, substantive due process cases, federalism cases, and 
equal protection cases.  See Glensy, supra note 5, at 373-87 (cataloging these cases).  The 
Court’s recent use of comparative legal sources has been more extensive than in the past.  
See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2570 (2004); Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 245 
(“[R]eferences to non-U.S. constitutional law have become more frequent in recent 
years . . . .”). 
 16. See Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 245 
(“Four Justices—Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer—have adverted to non-U.S. law 
in their opinions, while three—Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas—have written opinions 
expressly criticizing references to non-U.S. law.”); see also supra note 4. 
 17. Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 
(2002); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999); Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); see also Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 984 (2002) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
SEGAL_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:21 PM 
2006] DEATH PENALTY AND FOREIGN LAW  107 
sex to engage in certain sexual conduct was unconstitutional as applied to 
two adult males who had privately engaged in consensual sodomy.18  The 
Lawrence holding overruled the Court’s prior decision in Bowers v. 
Hardwick.19  In support of its decision, the majority noted that the 
European Court of Human Rights has not followed Bowers and that 
“[o]ther nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the 
protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual 
conduct.”20  Countering Kennedy’s majority opinion, Justices Scalia, 
Rehnquist, and Thomas filed a dissenting opinion vigorously objecting to 
the majority’s citations of comparative law.21  The dissent denigrated the 
majority’s citation of foreign law, labeling it “meaningless and dangerous 
dicta.”22  In support of its opinion, the dissent proclaimed that “this 
Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions, on 
Americans.”23
This Comment examines the role that foreign and international law has 
played in the Court’s death penalty cases.  Part I of this Comment provides 
background and explains the relevance of foreign and international law in 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Part II forms the core of this Comment 
and argues that, the sensational degree of controversy notwithstanding, 
foreign and international law have been peripheral to the Court’s death 
penalty decisions.  It demonstrates that in capital punishment jurisprudence, 
comparative materials function, if at all, merely as a minor consideration in 
a multifaceted analysis.  It further argues that the Court develops, adopts, 
and sustains a “national consensus” analytical paradigm in its death penalty 
decisions and that this calculated paradigm severely constrains the judicial 
impact of these comparative materials.  Part III of this Comment presents 
the position of death penalty abolitionists that the Court should grant 
foreign and international law supremacy over the national consensus and 
argues that this position runs counter to the Court’s consistently sustained 
national consensus paradigm.  Finally, Part IV of this Comment presents 
the view of several commentators that the judicial impact of foreign and 
international law on the Court has been exceptionally limited in all 
jurisprudential areas, a view that dovetails with the conclusions of this 
Comment. 
 
 
 18. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 19. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186. 
 20. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576. 
 21. Id. at 598 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. (citing Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
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I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE  
AND COMPARATIVE LEGAL SOURCES 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence constitutes an area of law in which 
foreign and international legal materials have been invoked with great 
frequency.  Indeed, citations to comparative legal materials have become a 
hallmark of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
The suitability of comparative legal materials to Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence derives from the Court’s interpretation of that Amendment.  
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of “cruel and unusual 
punishment.”24  In two critical cases, Weems v. United States and Trop v. 
Dulles, the Court molded the Eighth Amendment, making it ripe for 
comparative legal analysis and prone to the citation of comparative legal 
materials.25
Early in the twentieth century, the case of Paul A. Weems confronted the 
Supreme Court.
 
26  Weems falsified public records and was sentenced to 
twelve years of hard and painful labor, deprived of many basic rights, and 
subjected to a perpetual state of surveillance.27  In a trail-blazing decision, 
the Court maintained that the constitutional clause “cruel and unusual 
punishment” must be defined in a dynamic manner based on society’s ever-
developing perceptions of civility.28  The Court eschewed a static 
perception of “cruel and unusual punishment,” stating that its definition is 
“not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion 
becomes enlightened by humane justice.”29
 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
   Under this interpretation of 
the Eighth Amendment, the Court held that Weems’s severe penalty 
 25. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 
U.S. 349 (1910).  In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822-23 n.7 (1988) (plurality 
opinion), the Court explained that the underlying rationale of using national objective 
indicators in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is rooted in the very language of the 
Constitution.  The Court stated: 
Our capital punishment jurisprudence has consistently recognized that 
contemporary standards, as reflected by the actions of the legislatures and the 
juries, provide an important measure of whether the death penalty is “cruel and 
unusual.”  Part of the rationale for this index of constitutional value lies in the 
very language of the construed clause: whether an action is “unusual” depends, in 
common usage, upon the frequency of its occurrence or the magnitude of its 
acceptance.  
Id. 
 26. Weems, 217 U.S. at 349. 
 27. Id. at 363-64. 
 28. Id. at 378. 
 29. Id. 
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amounted to cruel and unusual punishment and was unconstitutional.30
The Court built on its progressive holding in Weems in the landmark 
case of Trop v. Dulles.
 
31  Albert L. Trop, an American soldier serving in 
North Africa during 1944, was caught deserting the army and forced to 
stand trial.32  A general court-martial convicted Trop of desertion and 
sentenced him to three years of hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and 
allowances, and a dishonorable discharge.33  As a result of his dishonorable 
discharge, Trop was refused a passport and was thus effectively denied 
American citizenship.34  Trop sought a declaratory judgment granting him 
citizenship and brought his case up the judicial ladder to the Supreme 
Court.35
Chief Justice Warren led a plurality opinion holding that the imposition 
of denationalization for army desertion constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment and is unconstitutional.
 
36  Citing Weems as precedent, the 
Court maintained that the scope of “cruel and unusual punishment” is 
subject to change and encompasses punishments considered cruel and 
unusual by mankind’s newfound sensitivities.37  In Trop’s oft-cited phrase, 
the contours of “cruel and unusual punishment” are determined by “the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”38  The Court found that the imposition of denationalization as a 
punishment violates society’s evolving standards of decency and is 
therefore barred by the Eighth Amendment.39
Yet Trop did more than merely cement this progressive interpretive 
principle, it licensed the use of comparative legal materials in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  In illustrating that the imposition of 
denationalization violates the Eighth Amendment, the Court invoked 
comparative legal materials as an index of society’s standards of decency.
  Trop thus firmly cemented 
the progressive interpretive principle that was launched and outlined in 
Weems: the meaning of the Eighth Amendment hinges on the standards of 
civility in contemporary society. 
40
 
 30. Id. at 381. 
  
The Trop Court noted that virtually all the civilized nations of the world 
 31. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 32. Id. at 87. 
 33. Id. at 88. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 101. 
 37. Id. at 100-01. 
 38. Id. at 101. 
 39. Id. at 100-01. 
 40. Id. at 102-03. 
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disallow the imposition of denationalization as a punishment and that only 
two countries impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion.41  The 
Court cited these sources in a blithe, matter-of-fact manner, as if it were 
only natural to look to these sources for judicial guidance.  Nevertheless, 
by employing comparative materials to measure society’s decency 
standards, the Warren plurality tacitly recognized that these sources 
represent reliable indicators of society’s decency norms, lending the 
Court’s imprimatur to comparative legal citations.  Quietly yet 
unambiguously, Trop authorized the citation of comparative legal materials 
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.42
Trop’s license to cite foreign and international law has been well-used.  
In particular, liberal-minded justices have seized upon this license and have 
frequently cited foreign and international legal materials in their capital 
punishment opinions.  For example, in Atkins v. Virginia, Justice Stevens 
filed the majority opinion for the Court and ruled that the execution of 
mentally retarded criminals constitutes cruel and unusual punishment as 
defined by the evolving standards of decency of a maturing society.
 
43  In 
support of its decision, the Court noted that “[w]ithin the world community, 
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally 
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”44  Similarly, in the 
celebrated Roper v. Simmons case Justice Kennedy filed the majority 
opinion for the Court, holding that the execution of individuals under the 
age of eighteen at the time of their capital crimes entails cruel and unusual 
punishment as defined by the evolving standards of decency of a maturing 
society.45  As in Atkins, the Court in Roper cited international opinion 
against the juvenile death penalty in support of its decision.46
 
 41. Id. 
 
 42. In his dissenting opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325 (2002) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting), the late Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 
U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality opinion), the Court rejected the view of Trop that comparative 
legal sources are relevant in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Justice Rehnquist 
emphasized that the Trop opinion represents a mere plurality of the Court and that the Trop 
plurality failed to justify its use of comparative materials.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 325.  This 
position is difficult to sustain for two reasons.  First, Stanford is the only authority that 
Justice Rehnquist cites in support of his position—yet even Stanford did not reject the 
citations of comparative materials altogether; it merely consigned them to a confirmatory 
role.  See discussion infra pp. 20-21.  Also, though the Trop opinion was signed by a mere 
plurality of the Court, the part of the Court’s decision in Stanford that downplays the role of 
comparative legal materials was also signed by a mere plurality of the Court, a point Justice 
Rehnquist fails to mention.  See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 n.1. 
 43. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
 44. Id. at 316 n.21. 
 45. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005). 
 46. Id. 
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II. THE MARGINALITY OF COMPARATIVE MATERIALS IN DEATH 
PENALTY CASES 
A careful analysis of the way in which the Court uses comparative 
materials in its death penalty cases illustrates their marginal role.  While 
death penalty cases have provoked much of the controversy over the 
citation of foreign and international legal materials, the Court has never 
regarded these sources as judicially significant indicators of society’s 
decency standards.  Because the Court accords only minimal judicial value 
to comparative legal materials, these materials have not been pivotal in the 
Court’s death penalty decisions. 
In death penalty cases, comparative materials function, if at all, merely 
as a single consideration in a multidimensional analysis to determine the 
meaning of cruel and unusual punishment—and a highly attenuated 
consideration at that.  Death penalty case law illustrates that the Court has 
consciously erected a carefully calibrated hierarchy of sources functioning 
as objective indicators of society’s decency standards.  The Court 
deliberately, meticulously, and consistently sustains this hierarchal 
structure.  This calculated hierarchical structure is comprised of a mosaic of 
sources, including national legislative enactments, national jury sentencing 
determinations, and foreign and international law.  The Court ascribes the 
greatest degree of reliability to national sources and a lesser degree of 
reliability to foreign and international legal sources. 
The national sources that the Court recognizes as highly reliable 
objective indicators of society’s decency standards are U.S. legislative 
enactments and U.S. jury sentencing determinations.  The Court terms the 
results of its analysis of these national sources “the national consensus”47 
and considers the “national consensus” of paramount importance.  Where 
national legislative enactments and national jury determinations allow for a 
given punishment, the “national consensus” does not deem this punishment 
cruel and unusual.  Conversely, where national legislative enactments and 
national jury sentencing determinations disallow a given punishment, the 
“national consensus” deems this punishment cruel and unusual.  Thus, 
there is always a national consensus, allowing the Court to conduct its 
evaluation of society’s decency standards in its self-crafted national 
majoritarian analytical paradigm.48
The national majoritarian paradigm ensures that the national consensus 
 
 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 562; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371; Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 848-49 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 48. Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 776, 778-80, 782-86; Alford, Misusing, 
supra note 5, at 59-61; see also Alford, Postscript on Lawrence, supra note 5, at 914, 920. 
SEGAL_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:21 PM 
112 FORDHAM URB. L.J.  [Vol. XXXIII 
is determinative of the Court’s holding.  Because the national consensus 
represents the most reliable indicator of society’s decency standards, and 
occupies the uppermost part of the hierarchal structure of society’s decency 
standards indicia, the Court pinpoints society’s decency standards using the 
national consensus as its yardstick.  By rendering comparative legal sources 
subsidiary to the national consensus, the national majoritarian paradigm 
severely restricts their judicial value.  The Court invokes comparative legal 
materials only in a confirmatory capacity, to corroborate the national 
consensus: comparative legal materials that accord with the national 
consensus merely confirm the national consensus and comparative sources 
that collide with the national consensus, necessarily yield it.49  So long as 
the Court adheres to stare decisis principles and continues to evaluate 
society’s decency standards within a national majortiarian analytical 
framework, the national consensus will invariably trump contrary foreign 
and international legal sources.50
A. The Hierarchal Structure of Objective Indicators of Society’s 
Decency Standards, the Primacy of the National Consensus, and the 
Sub-Primacy of National Legislative Enactments Within the  
National Consensus 
 
U.S. legislative enactments and U.S. jury sentencing determinations 
form the apex of the hierarchal structure of society’s decency standards 
indicia.  Woodson v. North Carolina made this point explicitly, classifying 
U.S. legislative enactments and U.S. jury sentencing determinations as the 
“two crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency.”51
 
 49. Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 59-61; see also Alford, Federal Courts, supra 
note 5, at 778, 782-86; Alford, Postscript on Lawrence, supra note 5, at 914 (“The Court 
has never considered international law particularly relevant.  At most it has considered the 
actual practice of other countries as potentially relevant to the constitutional inquiry.”).  
Alford argues that a similar dynamic is at work in areas of substantive due process: 
“[S]imilar to Eighth Amendment, references to global standards under the conception of 
ordered liberty provides an additional check on substantive due process, to be utilized if it 
already has been established that a right is part of our own history and tradition.”  Alford, 
Postscript on Lawrence, supra note 5, at 921; see also Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 59 
n.17. 
  The Supreme 
Court unequivocally ascribes primacy to the national indicia of society’s 
 50. It should be noted that the Court has repeatedly reserved the option to rule contrary 
to the objective indicators of society’s decency standards.  See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).  
Compare, however, the views of the plurality opinion and dissenting opinion in Stanford, 
492 U.S. at 380, 382 (indicating the analysis of constitutionality of cruel and unusual 
punishment should be a two-part test). 
 51. 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976). 
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decency standards. 
Several cases highlight the prominence of national jury sentencing 
determinations in the hierarchal structure of society’s decency standards 
indicia.  For example, in Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Court relied heavily 
on national jury sentencing determinations in assessing society’s decency 
standards.52  The Court explained that jury sentencing determinations are 
essential to the Court’s evaluation of society’s decency standards because 
the jury serves “as a link between contemporary community values and the 
penal system.”53  Likewise, in Furman v. Georgia, national jury sentencing 
decisions served as a prime factor in the Court’s holding restricting various 
arbitrary procedures in the imposition of the death penalty.54
Much as the Court highly values national jury sentencing 
determinations, it values national legislative enactments even more.  The 
national consensus is comprised of a two-tiered hierarchal structure 
consisting most importantly of national legislative enactments and less 
importantly of national jury sentencing determinations.  This painstakingly 
nuanced bifurcation between the two national indicators is telling; it is 
reflective of the great importance of the highly-calibrated hierarchal 
structure of objective indicators.  The Court is eminently serious about the 
varying reliability values it ascribes to the objective indicators. 
 
It is readily apparent that the Court assigns the greatest degree of 
reliability to national legislative enactments.  Language indicating the 
primacy of national legislative enactments litters Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence: national legislative judgments “weigh heavily,” while 
national jury sentencing decisions merely represent a “significant and 
reliable objective index of contemporary values.”55  The Court further 
indicates, “[t]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of 
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s 
legislatures,” though “[w]e have also looked to data concerning the actions 
of sentencing juries.”56  Additionally, as Justice Rehnquist recognized, 
while “we ascribe primacy to legislative enactments,” national jury 
sentencing determinations are “entitled to less weight than legislative 
judgments.”57
 
 52. 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). 
  National legislative enactments are “the primary and most 
 53. Id. at 519 n.15. 
 54. 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831-34 (1988) 
(plurality opinion). 
 55. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175, 181 (1976). 
 56. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), overruled by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 323 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 57. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), overruled 
by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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reliable indication of consensus.”58  Finally, as Justice Blackmun 
characterized the Court’s position, the country’s legislation provides “the 
best evidence” of society’s decency standards.59  While the decisions of 
state legislatures are “first among” the indicia that reflect the public attitude 
toward a given sanction, “[w]e have also been guided by the sentencing 
decisions of juries.”60
The order in which the Court analyzes the national indicators of 
society’s decency standards further reflects both the primacy of the national 
consensus and the nuanced bifurcation between the two national indicators.  
For example, the plurality opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma set the 
agenda for its review by stating: “we first review relevant legislative 
enactments . . . then refer to jury determinations.”
 
61  This order of review 
set by Thompson serves as a model for other death penalty cases: they first 
review national legislative enactments and only then proceed to review 
national jury sentencing determinations.62
B. Indications and Illustrations of the Marginal and Confirmatory 
Role of Comparative Legal Sources in Death Penalty Cases 
 
While the Court considers national legislative enactments and national 
jury sentencing determinations the two crucial indicators of society’s 
decency standards, the Court regards foreign and international law with far 
less deference.  The primacy of the national indicia consigns comparative 
legal sources to the periphery.  The Court does not accord independent 
judicial value to comparative legal materials; rather, it values supranational 
materials only as corroboratory of the national consensus. 
Case law reflects the marginal role of comparative legal sources in the 
Court’s death penalty cases in several ways.  These include: the patent 
omission of comparative materials in some of the Court’s death penalty 
decisions;63
 
 58. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 the minimal degree of attention the Court expends on 
comparative sources as compared with national decency standards 
 59. Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 1119-20 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 60. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (emphasis added); see also Tison v. 
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987) (“[S]ubstantial and recent legislative authorization of the 
death penalty for the crime of felony murder . . .  powerfully suggests that society does not 
reject the death penalty as grossly excessive under these circumstances.”) (first emphasis 
added). 
 61. 487 U.S. 815, 822 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 62. Stanford, 492 U.S. 361; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 63. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
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indicia;64 the Court’s recurrent tendency to relegate comparative sources to 
footnotes;65 the conspicuous omission of comparative sources from the 
Court’s agenda list of decency standards indicia it plans on considering;66 
and the Court’s revealing characterizations of comparative sources as 
merely confirming and supporting the national consensus.67
Perhaps the starkest indication of the non-centrality of foreign and 
international law in death penalty cases is the total absence of these 
materials in some of the Court’s decisions.  In several cases, the Court 
grapples to pinpoint society’s decency standards and fails to reference 
comparative legal materials, even in a cursory fashion.  For example, in 
both Roberts v. Louisiana
 
68 and Gregg v. Georgia,69
Yet even in cases where the Court does invoke foreign and international 
legal materials as objective indicia of society’s decency standards, these 
comparative materials are inessential to the Court’s decisions.  This is 
manifest in the highly asymmetrical degree of attention the Court expends 
on comparative legal materials as compared with national decency 
standards indicia.  National consensus indicators almost invariably occupy 
the bulk of the discussion, while foreign and international law occupy only 
a minor part.
 the Court assesses 
society’s decency standards by referring exclusively to national legislation 
and national jury determinations; neither decision troubles to reference 
foreign and international sources.  It is apparent that the Court does not 
view these materials as important indicators of objective societal standards. 
70  For example, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court’s analysis of 
national legislative enactments occupies over two full pages.71  Following 
this comprehensive analysis, the Court referenced the view of the world 
community;72  this reference, the only reference to foreign and international 
law in Atkins, occupies less than a single sentence.73
 
 64. See infra notes 
  The degree of 
attention the Court expends on each objective indicator is commensurate 
with its degree of reliability; while the great degree of attention the Court 
70-73 and accompanying text. 
 65. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 66. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text; see also Benvenuto, supra note 5, at 
2711-12, 2744-45. 
 67. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
 68. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 69. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 70. The sole exception to this pattern is Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), where 
the Court devotes substantial attention to comparative materials.  But see discussion infra at 
pp. 15-16 (arguing that even in Roper the role of comparative materials is merely 
confirmatory). 
 71. 536 U.S. 304, 314-17 (2002). 
 72. Id. at 316 n.21. 
 73. Id. 
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lavishes on the national decency standards indicia reflects their prominence 
in the Court’s analyses, the often nominal mention of comparative sources 
reflects their unimportance. 
Equally reflective of the non-centrality of comparative legal materials is 
the Court’s recurrent tendency to relegate these sources to a footnote.  In 
several death penalty cases the Court placed comparative sources in 
footnotes, underscoring their minimal significance.74
Another manifestation of the marginal role of comparative legal 
materials in the Court’s death penalty cases is the conspicuous omission of 
these sources from the Court’s agenda list of decency standards indicia it 
plans on considering.  Thompson v. Oklahoma instantiated this bizarre 
trend.
 
75  Near the outset of Thompson, the Court set out its agenda of 
review, listing the sources it planned on using as objective indicators of 
society’s decency standards.76  The Court listed only national legislative 
enactments and national jury determinations; it noticeably omitted 
comparative legal materials.77  In the substantive analysis section of its 
opinion, the Court unexpectedly broke out of the mold it set for its analysis 
by adding a single paragraph that cites the death penalty practices of 
several other countries alongside the views of professional organizations.78  
These comparative sources are nestled in a brief, isolated paragraph 
amongst extensive discussion of national legislative enactments and jury 
determinations.79  The structure employed in Thompson generates the 
discrete impression that the Court referenced comparative materials as an 
afterthought.  National legislative enactments and national jury sentencing 
decisions governed the judgment in Thompson; the references to foreign 
law are far from pivotal in the Court’s multifaceted calculus.80
Like the omission of comparative legal materials from the Court’s 
agenda list, the Court’s diffident terminology in discussing supranational 
legal materials also reflects their minimal role in capital punishment 
 
 
 74. Id.; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 n.22 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 596 n.10 (1977). 
 75. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also Benvenuto, supra note 5, at 2714-
16, 2747-48. 
 76. Thomspon, 487 U.S.at 822-23. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 830-31. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See The International Judicial Dialogue: When Domestic Constitutional Courts Join 
the Conversation, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2067-68 (2001) [hereinafter International 
Judicial Dialogue] (noting that the Thompson Court did not include comparative materials 
in its agenda of review and only referenced these materials after a detailed survey of 
national sources); see also Benvenuto, supra note 5, at 2711-12, 2744-45. 
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jurisprudence.  In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court conducted a comprehensive 
analysis of national legislative enactments to ascertain whether a national 
consensus exists to prohibit the execution of mentally retarded persons as 
cruel and unusual punishment.81  After finding that a consensus exists, the 
Court added a footnote referencing the views of the world community, 
reports of professional organizations, and American opinion polls.82  The 
Court considered these sundry sources “[a]dditional evidence . . . that this 
legislative judgment reflects a much broader social and professional 
consensus.”83  The Court concluded its footnote by adding: “Although 
these factors are by no means dispositive, their consistency with the 
legislative evidence lends further support to our conclusion that there is a 
consensus among those who have addressed the issue.”84  The Court did 
not suggest that the views of the world community are controlling; on the 
contrary, the Court distanced itself from this position.  After establishing a 
national consensus based on national legislative enactments, the Court 
referred to the views of the world community as additional evidence that 
lends further support to the national consensus.85
In Roper v. Simmons the Court employed terminology similar to Atkins 
in discussing comparative legal materials.
 
86  Roper prohibited the 
execution of individuals who were under eighteen years of age at the time 
of their capital crimes.87  As in Atkins, the Court in Roper first set out to 
determine whether a national consensus existed on this issue.88  Finding a 
national consensus against the execution of offenders under eighteen, the 
Court turned to the world community for corroboration of the national 
consensus.89
 
 81. 536 U.S. 304, 313-16 (2002). 
  The Court opened its discussion of international opinion by 
stating that its holding “finds confirmation in the stark reality that the 
United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official 
 82. Id. at 316 n.21. 
 83. Id. (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. (emphasis added). 
 85. See Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 60 (“[T]he Court in Atkins found a national 
consensus and then concluded that this consensus was consistent with a much broader 
consensus among others who have considered the matter.”); see also Alford, Federal 
Courts, supra note 5, at 779-80, 780 n.395; Alford, Postscript on Lawrence, supra note 5, at 
920; cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) (stating that in Atkins the Court found 
a national consensus based on national legislative enactments and national jury sentencing 
determinations). 
 86. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 87. Id. at 578-79. 
 88. Id. at 564-75. 
 89. Id. at 575-78. 
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sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”90  After analyzing the international 
opinion on the issue, the Court stated: “The opinion of the world 
community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and 
significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”91  Though Roper 
engaged in an extensive discussion of comparative legal materials, the 
Court nevertheless expressly valued these sources only inasmuch as they 
confirmed the national consensus.  In fact, the Court included four detailed 
appendices relating to national legislative enactments to corroborate its 
finding of a national consensus.92
Coker v. Georgia
  As in Atkins, the Roper Court disclaimed 
any intent to regard international opinion as controlling.  Also as in Atkins, 
the Court in Roper first established a national consensus and referred to 
international opinion only to find confirmation for the national consensus. 
93 furnishes a neat illustration of the hierarchal 
structure of objective indicators of society’s standards and the minimal 
value the Court assigns to comparative materials in its evaluation of these 
decency standards.  Ehrlich Anthony Coker was convicted of rape and 
sentenced to death in Georgia.94  In a plurality opinion, the Court ruled that 
the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment.95
Toward the beginning of its analysis, Coker stated that Eighth 
Amendment judgments should not be rooted in the “subjective views of 
individual justices”; rather, “judgment should be informed by objective 
factors to the maximum possible extent.”
 
96  Coker continued, “[t]o this end, 
attention must be given to the public attitudes concerning a particular 
sentence—history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of 
juries reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be consulted.”97  In 
support of choosing these objective indicators in making its Eighth 
Amendment determinations, Coker pointed to Gregg, which based its 
decision largely on national legislative attitudes and national jury 
sentencing decisions.98
Having meticulously set the agenda for its assessment, Coker launched 
into an extensive analysis of national legislative enactments.
 
99
 
 90. Id. at 575 (emphasis added). 
  This 
 91. Id. at 578 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. at 579-86. 
 93. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 94. Id. at 586. 
 95. Id. at 592. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 593-97. 
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analysis occupies over two full pages of the Court’s opinion.100  The Court 
summed up its analysis by stating that “[t]he current judgment with respect 
to the death penalty for rape . . . obviously weighs very heavily on the side 
of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult 
woman.”101
Then, inexplicably deviating from the agenda the Court set for itself, 
Coker followed its review of legislative enactments with an isolated 
footnote, stating: 
 
In Trop v. Dulles . . . the plurality took pains to note the climate of 
international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular 
punishment.  It is thus not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in 
the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape 
where death did not ensue.102
This lone statement, consigned to a footnote and based on a single survey, 
represents the sole reference to comparative legal sources, one in which the 
Court noted that it considered international opinion “not irrelevant” to its 
assessment of cruel and unusual punishment.
 
103
Returning to its agenda, Coker proceeded to review the sentencing 
decisions of U.S. juries, arguing that it is “important to look to the 
sentencing decisions that [American] juries have made in the course of 
assessing whether capital punishment is an appropriate penalty for the 
crime being tried.”
 
104  The Court then reviewed jury sentencing decisions 
and inferred that in the vast majority of cases, U.S. juries have not imposed 
the death sentence for the crime of rape.105
Coker is instructive.  The Court referenced three objective indicators of 
society’s decency standards: national legislative enactments, national jury 
sentencing decisions, and international opinion.  As in Atkins, the Court 
expended the overwhelming part of its inquiry on national legislative 
enactments and national jury sentencing determinations.
  Coker’s review of national jury 
sentencing decisions marked the conclusion of the Court’s inquiry into 
society’s decency standards. 
106
 
 100. Id. 
  The Court also 
considered legislative enactments before jury sentencing determinations.  
This is consistent both with the Court’s oft-proclaimed view that national 
legislative enactments constitute the most important objective indicator of 
 101. Id. at 596. 
 102. Id. at 596 n.10 (emphasis added). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 596. 
 105. Id. at 595-98. 
 106. See supra p. 13. 
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society’s decency standards,107 and with the trajectory of review set forth in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma.108  The Court omitted international opinion from 
its list of the objective indicators it intended to review, first mentioning 
international opinion in a footnote of its decision,109 a pattern seen in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma.110  As in Atkins, when the Court factored 
international opinion into its equation, it allotted international opinion a 
single, isolated footnote.111  In fact, the Court justified its use of 
comparative materials by stating that they are “not irrelevant here”––a far 
cry from the critical value of the sources comprising the national 
consensus.112
Like Coker, Enmund v. Florida also illustrates the minimal value the 
Court assigns to non-U.S. legal sources in assessing society’s decency 
standards.  Enmund presented an Eighth Amendment proportionality issue: 
whether the Eighth Amendment permits the imposition of the death penalty 
on a defendant who merely aids and abets a felony during which a murder 
is committed by another, but who does not commit murder, attempt to 
commit murder, or even intend that the murder take place.
 
113  The Court 
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death 
penalty in these circumstances.114
As Coker modeled its agenda of review after Gregg, Enmund modeled 
its agenda of review after Coker.
 
115  Enmund thus purposefully followed 
Coker’s trajectory.  It opened with a thorough analysis of national 
legislative enactments, concluding that the majority of national legislative 
enactments reject capital punishment in the circumstances presented in the 
case.116  Following its several-page review of national legislative 
enactments, Enmund focused on the sentencing decisions of U.S. juries, 
noting that “[t]he evidence is overwhelming that American juries have 
repudiated imposition of the death penalty for crimes such as [the] 
petitioners.”117
Before concluding its inquiry into society’s standards of decency, 
 
 
 107. See supra pp. 10-11. 
 108. 487 U.S. 815, 822, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion). See supra p. 11. 
 109. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10. 
 110. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822 n.4.  See discussion supra pp. 13-14.  This pattern is also 
found in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313, 316 n.21 (2002). 
 111. 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (2002). See supra p. 14. 
 112. See International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 80, at 2090 n.105. 
 113. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 783-88 (1982). 
 114. Id. at 788. 
 115. Id. at 788-89. 
 116. Id. at 789. 
 117. Id. at 794. 
SEGAL_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:21 PM 
2006] DEATH PENALTY AND FOREIGN LAW  121 
however, the Court added one footnote.118  The footnote cited Coker, 
stating that international opinion is “not irrelevant” and proceeded to state: 
“the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in England and India, 
severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth 
countries, and is unknown in continental Europe.”119
Enmund yields a picture identical to Coker.  Enmund first considered 
national legislative enactments and then considered national jury 
sentencing decisions.  These national indicators form the linchpin of the 
Court’s rationale, and the Court naturally expended the overwhelming part 
of its inquiry into society’s decency standards analyzing these sources.  
Only then, in a lone footnote, did the Court turn to international opinion, 
since international opinion is “not irrelevant” to the inquiry.
 
120
C. The Inability of Comparative Legal Sources to Trump the  
National Consensus 
 
The preceding sections of this Part demonstrated that the primacy of the 
national consensus in the Court’s hierarchal structure of objective 
indicators of society’s decency standards ensures that comparative legal 
materials carry little judicial weight.  Where comparative legal sources are 
congruent with the national consensus, they merely serve to confirm the 
Court’s perception of society’s decency standards, a perception molded by 
an evaluation of national legislative enactments and national jury 
determinations.  This section demonstrates the converse ramification of the 
national majoritarian paradigm: because the Court ascribes the greatest 
value to national indicators of society’s decency standards, contrary 
comparative legal materials cannot trump the national consensus.121
The Court’s national majoritarian paradigm incapacitates foreign and 
international law from overruling the national consensus.  In some cases, 
the Court finds it unnecessary to articulate this position.  For example, in 
Gregg v. Georgia the Court did not even consider foreign and international 
law in evaluating society’s evolving decency standards.
 
122  This is hardly 
accidental.  In Gregg, the Court held that the imposition of capital 
punishment is not per se unconstitutional; in other words, Gregg 
legitimized the imposition of the death penalty in the United States.123
 
 118. Id. at 794 n.22. 
  In 
 119. Id. 
 120. See International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 80, at 2090 n.105. 
 121. See Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 59-61; see also Alford, Postscript on 
Lawrence, supra note 5, at 914, 920. 
 122. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 123. Id. at 187. 
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this context, foreign and international law would likely show that the 
broader society’s decency standards disallow the imposition of the death 
penalty, contrary to the national consensus.  Operating within a national 
majoritarian paradigm, the Court naturally considered supranational 
materials irrelevant. 
In other cases, however, a dissenting opinion prompted the Court to 
verbalize its position that the national consensus, not comparative legal 
sources, determines society’s decency standards.  The plurality opinion in 
Stanford v. Kentucky offers the clearest articulation of the absolute 
ascendancy of the national consensus over foreign and international law.124  
In Stanford, the dissenting opinion considered comparative materials in 
assessing society’s decency standards.125
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are 
dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici 
(accepted by the dissent) that the sentencing practices of other countries 
are relevant.  While “the practices of other nations, particularly other 
democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform 
among our people is not merely a historical accident, but rather so 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ that it occupies a place not 
merely in our mores, but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well,” 
they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, 
that the practice is accepted among our people.
  Responding to the dissent, the 
Court stated: 
126
As Roger P. Alford notes, Stanford v. Kentucky provides a graphic 
example of the national majoritarian dynamic disallowing comparative 
legal materials from superceding the national consensus.
 
127
 
 124. 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.1 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
  According to 
the Stanford plurality, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requires that a 
threshold national consensus be established before it considers foreign law 
 125. Id. at 389-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Note that even the dissent first looks to 
national indicators of society’s decency standards before turning to the legislation of foreign 
countries.  Id. at 383-87; see also Benvenuto, supra note 5, at 2713-14, 2746 (discussing the 
dissenting opinion of Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993-99 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting)); Blackmun, supra note 4, at 48 (“If the substance of the Eighth Amendment is 
to turn on the evolving standards of decency of the civilized world, there can be no 
justification for limiting judicial inquiry to the opinions of the United States.”). 
 126. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 n.1 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-
69 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting)) (citations omitted).  Based on Stanford, the 
confirmatory role of comparative legal materials serves as an additional check on the Eighth 
Amendment in ensuring that the national consensus is not simply accidental but that the 
prohibition is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.  Alford, Misusing, supra note 5 at 
60. 
 127. Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 60; see also Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, 
at 779-80, Alford, Postscript on Lawrence, supra note 5, at 919-20. 
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relevant to its decisions.128  As Alford states, Stanford illustrates that “[t]he 
practice abroad is relevant only after uniformity has been established at 
home.”129  Supranational law contrary to the national consensus is banished 
from the calculus.130
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Knight v. Florida further 
demonstrates that comparative legal sources cannot trump a divergent 
national consensus.
 
131  In Knight, petitioners Knight and Moore argued that 
execution after having languished twenty years on death row constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment.132  In support of their position, Knight and 
Moore cited foreign law.133  Though the Court denied certiorari, Justice 
Breyer filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court should grant 
certiorari based in part on the foreign law cited by the petitioners.134
I write only to point out that I am unaware of any support in the American 
constitutional tradition or in this Court’s precedent for the proposition that 
a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral 
procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed.  Indeed, 
were there any such support in our own jurisprudence, it would be 
unnecessary for proponents of the claim to rely on the European Court of 
Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of 
India, or the Privy Council.
  
Justice Thomas countered Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion by stating: 
135
Justice Thomas maintained that citations consisting exclusively of foreign 
law demonstrate a “negative” national consensus, i.e. a consensus that 
execution following twenty years on death row is not cruel and unusual 
punishment.
 
136  Once this “negative” national consensus is established, 
foreign law becomes impotent; it cannot override a contrary national 
consensus.137
 
 128. See International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 80, at 2068 (commenting on 
Stanford that “[t]he Court’s previous capital punishment cases support the claim that the 
Court must first establish a basis for its decision in American practice and precedent”). 
 
 129. Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 778 (arguing based on Stanford that 
society’s evolving standards “are determined based on a national consensus” and “[t]he 
practice of other nations is relevant only after uniformity has been established within the 
United States”); see also Alford, Postscript on Lawrence, supra note 5, at 920. 
 130. See International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 80, at 2067-68. 
 131. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990-93 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 132. Id. at 990. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 993-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Even Justice Breyer does not argue that comparative legal sources should control the 
Court’s decision.  Id. at 996 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Obviously this foreign authority does 
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In Foster v. Florida the Court revisited the issue presented by Knight.138  
Following his death sentence, Charles Kenneth Foster languished over 
twenty-seven years in prison.139  He petitioned the Court for a writ of 
certiorari, arguing that execution following twenty-seven years on death 
row constituted cruel and unusual punishment.140  Once again, the Court 
denied certiorari; once again, Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion 
arguing that the Court should grant certiorari based in part on foreign law; 
and once again, Justice Thomas responded to Justice Breyer’s dissent.141  
Justice Thomas referenced his concurring opinion in Knight and added that 
“[t]his Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign 
moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”142  In effect, Justice Thomas 
maintained that, absent a prerequisite national consensus, foreign law is 
irrelevant in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.143
Another line of cases that demonstrates the inability of foreign and 
international law to trump the national consensus begins with Thompson v. 
Oklahoma and continues through Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. 
Simmons.
  Foreign law cannot 
impose its views on Americans; it cannot supercede a conflicting national 
consensus. 
144  In these cases, it is the dissenting opinion that demonstrates 
the primacy of national sources over supranational sources.  This line of 
cases contains the following distinctive pattern.  The leading opinion 
argues that a national consensus considers a given punishment cruel and 
unusual.145  It confirms this national consensus by citing comparative legal 
materials.146  The leading opinion prompts a vituperative dissenting 
opinion––headed by Justice Scalia––arguing that the Court has failed to 
establish a national consensus.147
 
not bind us.”); see also Blum, supra note 1, at 180-83 (arguing that Justice Breyer uses 
foreign materials merely to illustrate the need to consider the propriety of delayed 
executions, and does not use these sources in constitutional interpretation). 
  The dissent opens by challenging the 
 138. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002). 
 139. Id. at 991 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 992. 
 141. Id. at 990-95. 
 142. Id. at 990 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324-25 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting)) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 143. Id. at 991. 
 144. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 
(2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 145. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-68; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826-
31. 
 146. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830. 
 147. Roper, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337-38 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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leading opinion’s rationale in interpreting the statistical data underlying its 
alleged national consensus.148  In dismantling the leading opinion’s 
“national consensus” disallowing the punishment in question, the dissent 
argues that in fact the national consensus permits the punishment in 
question.149  Having established a “negative” national consensus, the 
dissent turns to the comparative legal materials cited by the leading 
opinion.150  The dissent then duly discards these materials as irrelevant 
since dissonant comparative materials cannot trump the national 
consensus.151  In the words of Justice Scalia, “where there is not first a 
settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations . . . 
cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.”152
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MARGINALITY OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
SOURCES FOR THE KOH/ALFORD DEBATE: SHOULD COMPARATIVE 
MATERIALS TRUMP THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE? 
 
As is well-known, a majority of the world’s nations disallows the 
imposition of the death penalty.153  In particular, the Western world has 
vehemently condemned capital punishment.154  This strong opposition to 
capital punishment has become a cornerstone of the European human rights 
movement.155
Opponents of the United States’ continued imposition of the death 
penalty exploit the almost universal condemnation of capital 
punishment.
 
156
 
 148. Roper, 543 U.S. at 609-15; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342-48; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 867-
72. 
  They argue that the Court should be more receptive of 
 149. Roper, 543 U.S. at 609-15; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342-48; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 867-
72. 
 150. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4. 
 151. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-28; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 
n.4. 
 152. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4. 
 153. See, e.g., sources cited in Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 776 n.373; Nora 
V. Demleitner, The Death Penalty in the United States Following European Lead?, 81 OR. 
L. REV. 131 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on 
the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085 (2002) [hereinafter Koh, Paying Decent 
Respect]; James H. Wyman, Comment, Vengeance is Whose?: The Death Penalty and 
Cultural Relativism in International Law, 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 543 (1997). 
 154. See, e.g., Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 776 n.373; Demleitner, supra note 
153; Koh, Paying Decent Respect, supra note 153; Wyman, supra note 153. 
 155. See, e.g., Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 776 n.373; Demleitner, supra note 
153; Koh, Paying Decent Respect, supra note 153; Wyman, supra note 153. 
 156. Koh, International Law, supra note 5, at 56; see also Blackmun, supra note 4; Koh, 
Paying Decent Respect, supra note 153. 
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foreign and international law in deciding death penalty cases.157  In effect, 
they maintain that foreign and international law should trump a national 
consensus allowing the death penalty.158  For example, Harold Hongju 
Koh, an ardent death penalty abolitionist and chief spokesperson for the 
internationalists, has expressly stated the practices of other democratic 
nations should “constitute the most relevant evidence of what Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence calls the ‘evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.’”159
Roger P. Alford has countered the position of the international 
majoritarians.
 
160  Alford maintains that the predominance of national 
sources arises from the Court’s deep-seated respect for principles of 
federalism and American sovereignty.161  He warns that “[u]sing global 
opinions as a means of constitutional interpretation dramatically 
undermines sovereignty.”162  Recognizing that the Court employs a 
national majoritarian framework in its death penalty cases, Alford insists 
that global sources inconsistent with the national consensus cannot 
prevail.163  Alford argues that granting primacy to foreign and international 
legal sources will wrongfully undermine the Court’s well-settled precedent 
and unjustly thwart the sovereign will of the American people.164
 
 157. Blackmun, supra note 4; see also Koh, International Law, supra note 5, at 56; Koh, 
Paying Decent Respect, supra note 153. 
  Alford 
 158. Blackmun, supra note 4; see also Koh, International Law, supra note 5, at 56; Koh, 
Paying Decent Respect, supra note 153. 
 159. Blackmun, supra note 4; see also Koh, International Law, supra note 5, at 56 
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 365 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis added); 
Koh, Paying Decent Respect, supra note 153. 
 160. Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 772-91; see also Alford, Misusing, supra 
note 5, at 58-61.  For Koh’s response to Alford, see Koh, International Law, supra note 5, at 
55; for Alford’s reply to Koh’s response, see Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 61 n.30. 
 161. Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 785-86; Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 
59-61; cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322-28 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 162. Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 58; see also Benvenuto, supra note 5, at 2697, 
2711-20, 2742-51 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s use of foreign precedent has been 
rhetorical rather than substantive); Raalf, supra note 5, at 1260-63 (arguing that comparative 
materials have had little or no influence in constitutional jurisprudence).  Several 
commentators have also stated that the Court does not view comparative law as inherently 
significant but rather as a mere source for empirical data.  See, e.g., Paolo G. Carozza, “My 
Friend Is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights, 
81 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1086-87 (2003); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of 
Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE. L.J. 223, 226, 247 
(2001); Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational 
Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 526 
(2000). 
    163. Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 59-61; see also Alford, Federal Courts, supra 
note 5, at 784-85. 
 164. Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 59-61. 
SEGAL_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:21 PM 
2006] DEATH PENALTY AND FOREIGN LAW  127 
concludes: 
In short, the international countermajoritarian difficulty severely limits the 
degree of respect that can be shown to the global opinions of humanity 
when doing so shows disrespect to our own national experience . . . .  
Reliance on global standards of decency undermines the sovereign 
limitations inherent in federalist restraints, limitations born out of respect 
for the reserved powers of the states to assess which punishments are 
appropriate for which crimes.  To the extent that international 
majoritarians argue that global standards are relevant notwithstanding 
their inconsistency with American standards, this view reflects far less 
respect for federalism concerns than required by the Court.165
This Comment’s analysis of death penalty cases supports Alford’s 
contention that granting supremacy to comparative legal sources over the 
national consensus runs counter to the Court’s death penalty decisions.  
Because the Court consistently operates within a national majoritarian 
paradigm in evaluating society’s decency standards, allowing foreign and 
international law to override the national consensus negates the U.S. 
common law tradition.
 
166
IV. THE MARGINALITY OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL SOURCES IN 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS RELATING TO ALL AREAS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Several commentators emphasize the limited utility that the Supreme 
Court has derived from comparative legal sources in all areas of 
jurisprudence.  They maintain that, in general, comparative legal sources 
have been immaterial to the Court’s decisions.  For example, Mark Tushnet 
forcefully states that “[p]rior to Lawrence v. Texas, no recent Supreme 
Court decision relied on non-U.S. constitutional or para-constitutional law 
to support a proposition that was material to the majority’s analysis.”167  
Similarly, Sarah K. Harding surveyed the cases between 1993-2003 in 
which the Court cited laws of the United Kingdom, Canada, Austria, and 
New Zealand.168
 
 165. Id. at 60-61. 
  Harding makes the sweeping observation that “in all of 
these cases, the foreign law appeared as nothing more than a polite 
reference,” and that “there was no extended discussion of the foreign law 
 166. On the consistency of the Court regarding the role of comparative legal materials in 
death penalty decisions, see, for example, Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 779. 
 167. Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 241; see also 
id. at 244 (“The current Court’s first use of non-U.S. law to support a position relevant to its 
disposition came in Lawrence v. Texas . . . .”). 
 168. Harding, supra note 5, at 419-20. 
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being cited.”169  Harding concludes, “[i]n short, the U.S. Supreme Court 
and U.S. courts in general seldom cite foreign law.”170
Recently, Louis J. Blum analyzed the purposes for which the Court has 
invoked foreign and international law.
 
171  Blum concludes that in recent 
cases comparative legal materials were never central to the Court’s 
decisions and that unfailingly the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution 
stands independent of any supranational support.172  Blum maintains that 
“[f]oreign materials are used only to clarify, or lend support to, the 
reasoning behind discrete steps in the interpretive process.”173
Blum corroborates his argument with numerous cases.
 
174  For example, 
Blum analyzes the Court’s use of comparative legal materials in Culombe 
v. Connecticut.175  Blum argues that the Court’s decision is ultimately 
grounded in U.S. precedent and that the Court used foreign law in Culombe 
merely to support the threshold necessity of the constitutional analysis.176  
Likewise, Blum argues that the Court’s decision in Washington v. 
Glucksberg rests firmly on U.S. precedent and that the Court used foreign 
legal materials merely to facilitate its determination that deviation from 
U.S. precedent is unwarranted.177
Blum goes a step further, however.  According to Blum, it is not 
incidental that foreign and international law are peripheral to the Court’s 
decisions; rather, the impact of the comparative materials on constitutional 
interpretation is necessarily limited.
 
178
 
 169. Id. at 420-21. 
  Blum explains that because the 
 170. Id. at 420.  Glensy argues with these commentators and maintains that the Court 
integrates comparative references within its broader analysis.  Glensy, supra note 5, at 372-
73.  Even if Glensy is correct, however, the Court’s integration of comparative materials 
within the broader analysis does not mean that these sources contributed significantly to the 
Court’s decision.  A similar error is made by David Fontana in his reply to Tushnet.   See 
generally Fontana, The Next Generation, supra note 5.  Tushnet argues that “[p]rior to 
Lawrence v. Texas, no recent Supreme Court decision relied on non-U.S. constitutional or 
para-constitutional law to support a proposition that was material to the majority’s analysis.”  
Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 241.  In response, 
Fontana points to many cases where the Court’s majority opinion cited comparative 
materials.  Fontana, The Next Generation, supra note 5, at 451-57.  Again, the majority 
opinion’s citation of comparative materials does not per se render these materials essential 
to its analysis or decisions. 
 171. See generally Blum, supra note 1. 
 172. Id. at 171. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 173-94. 
 175. 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Blum, supra note 1, at 173-79. 
 176. Blum, supra note 1, at 175-79. 
 177. 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Blum, supra note 1, at 187-92. 
 178. Blum, supra note 1, passim. 
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Court operates within an interpretive framework based on precedent, its 
prior decisions are necessarily central, while the decisions of supranational 
legal sources are necessarily ancillary.179
Comparative materials, when used within the common law framework, 
and in the manner that courts have employed them, may be thought of as a 
lens and nothing more.  Comparative materials do not act on the 
Constitution or the domestic experience . . . . Because comparative 
materials do not alter the interaction between the Constitution and the 
American people, our understanding of the Constitution remains rooted in 
purely domestic sources.
  Blum elaborates: 
180
Thus, since the Court engages in comparative analysis only within the 
context of an interpretive framework grounded in precedent, Blum argues 
that the judicial impact of foreign and international law is limited from the 
outset; the common law framework itself suppresses the influence of 
foreign experiences.
 
181
To a limited extent, this Comment’s narrow analysis of the Court’s death 
penalty cases supports the broad argument of these commentators.  It 
marshals additional cases—indeed the entirety of capital punishment 
jurisprudence—where foreign and international law are peripheral to the 
Court’s decisions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most controversial jurisprudential issue of recent years 
concerns the United States Supreme Court’s use of foreign and 
international law to interpret the United States Constitution.  Citations to 
foreign and international law in death penalty cases have contributed 
greatly to this stormy controversy.  Nevertheless, an analysis of the High 
Court’s capital punishment cases demonstrates that the sensational degree 
of controversy belies the judicial significance of these citations. 
The Court maintains that the scope of “cruel and unusual punishment” 
depends on society’s evolving standards of decency.  The Court thus 
marshals objective indicators of society’s decency standards to determine 
 
 179. Id. at 166. 
 180. Id. at 199. 
 181. Id. at 197-98.  Arguably, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), represents the 
Court’s most aggressive use of non-U.S. legal materials in recent years.  Yet some scholars 
downplay the judicial significance of the non-U.S. legal materials even in Lawrence.  For 
example, after meticulously analyzing the Lawrence decision, Gerald L. Neuman maintains 
that comparative legal materials did not govern the Court’s decision but functioned “as 
merely one element of a complex inquiry into constitutional meaning.”  Neuman, supra note 
5, at 89-90. 
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the constitutionality of a given punishment.  These objective indicators 
include national legislative enactments, national jury sentencing 
determinations, and foreign and international law. 
Though the Court cites foreign and international law in its death penalty 
decisions, the judicial impact of these materials has been exceptionally 
limited.  In the Court’s death penalty cases, comparative legal materials 
function, if at all, as a minor consideration in a multifaceted analysis.  The 
Court considers the objective indicators of society’s decency standards of 
unequal degrees of reliability and, accordingly, grants them varying 
degrees of judicial weight.  In determining the meaning of “cruel and 
unusual punishment,” the Court consistently employs the national 
consensus analytical paradigm.  The national consensus consists of national 
legislative enactments and national jury sentencing determinations.  As the 
case law reflects in a multiplicity of ways, the Court considers the national 
consensus dominant and regards supranational legal sources as subsidiary.  
In the constellation of objective indicators, comparative legal sources are 
the least important.  By ascribing primacy to the national consensus, the 
Court severely restricts the judicial utility of foreign and international law, 
for the Court’s decision must ultimately hinge on the national consensus. 
Where foreign and international law accord with the national consensus, 
these comparative materials merely confirm the national consensus; 
conversely, where foreign and international law collide with the national 
consensus, these comparative materials yield to the national consensus. 
Because the Court consistently sustains the national majoritarian 
paradigm in its death penalty cases, arguments by death penalty 
abolitionists advocating the supremacy of supranational law over the 
national consensus negate the Court’s tradition.  The conclusions of this 
Comment’s narrow analysis of the Court’s death penalty cases comport 
with the conclusions of several commentators who emphasize the limited 
impact of comparative legal materials on the Court’s decisions in all areas 
of jurisprudence. 
 
